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ABSTRACT
Many organizations have the mission of assessing the
quality of broadband access services offered by Internet
Service Providers (ISPs). They deploy network probes
that periodically perform network measures towards se-
lected Internet services. By analyzing the data collected
by the probes it is often possible to gain a reasonable es-
timate of the bandwidth made available by the ISP. How-
ever, it is much more difficult to use such data to explain
who is responsible of the fluctuations of other network
qualities. This is especially true for latency, that is fun-
damental for several nowadays network services. On
the other hand, there are many publicly accessible BGP
routers that collect the history of routing changes and
that are good candidates to be used for understanding if
latency fluctuations depend on interdomain routing.
In this paper we provide a methodology that, given a
probe that is located inside the network of an ISP and
that executes latency measures and given a set of pub-
licly accessible BGP routers located inside the same ISP,
decides which routers are best candidates (if any) for
studying the relationship between variations of network
performance recorded by the probe and interdomain rout-
ing changes. We validate the methodology with experi-
mental studies based on data gathered by the RIPE NCC,
an organization that is well-known to be independent
and that publishes both BGP data within the Routing
Information Service (RIS) and probe measurement data
within the Atlas project.
1. INTRODUCTION
The perceived quality of Internet services strongly
depends on the performance of the network por-
tion that customer traffic has to traverse in order
to reach them. With the goal of improving this
quality, in the last few years many organizations
have started to massively assess the performance of
the network in reaching specific targets. For exam-
∗Supported by EU FP7 Project “Leone: From Global
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ple, the RIPE Atlas probes [6] continuously perform
Pings, Traceroutes, and HTTP requests towards se-
lected destinations like root name servers and suit-
ably located Web sites. Although these organiza-
tions gather huge amounts of performance informa-
tion, analyzing the collected data is a complex task,
which is often accomplished with limited accuracy
or completely left out. This is especially true when
the target service and the probes are located in dis-
tinct Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
Measured performance are subject to fluctuations
that depend on many networking factors, includ-
ing: bandwidth, network congestion, and routing
changes. In this paper we focus on analyzing the
relationship between variations of network perfor-
mance and interdomain routing changes. More pre-
cisely, we consider the following quite common sce-
nario, depicted in Fig. 1. A set P of probes is de-
ployed within the network of a certain ISP. These
probes perform periodical RTT and router-level path
measurements (pings, traceroutes) towards a set T
of targets that are spread anywhere in the Inter-
net, corresponding to relevant services. The results
of these measurements are stored for later use. A
set C of BGP routers, called Collector Peers (CPs),
is also deployed within the same ISP. These routers
have peerings with BGP routers of neighboring ISPs
and collect and store BGP updates received through
these peerings. We highlight that in this scenario
different CPs may collect at the same time different
information on the routing towards the same target.
Similarly, different probes may record different per-
formance in reaching the same target. Such a sce-
nario is nowadays quite common: projects like [1,
6, 22] have a growing base of deployed probes, while
other projects like [21, 23] provide historical BGP
routing data collected from hundreds of CPs.
The infrastructure described above is a valuable
source of information for the kind of analysis we
are interested in. In particular, we consider the fol-
lowing specific problem: given a probe in P and a
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target in T , which CPs in C are best candidates for
studying the relationship between variations of net-
work performance recorded by the probe and inter-
domain routing changes? Besides its methodolog-
ical importance, this investigation is relevant from
an applicative point of view: in fact, organizations
that assess the quality of consumer broadband ser-
vices can gain a much deeper insight in the quality
of the access offered by an ISP, rather than relying
only on an estimate of the available bandwidth. In
this investigation we concentrate our attention on
RTT measurements, because this is the most com-
monly available type of measurement, ICMP echo
request packets towards Internet services are un-
likely to be filtered out by routers, and the impor-
tance of latency in nowadays services is increasing,
as pointed out by several authors (see, e.g., [14]).
The problem we tackle is as difficult as “finding
a needle in a haystack” for several reasons: we do
not assume any knowledge on the network topol-
ogy; CPs may be deployed at arbitrary locations,
and may not coincide with egress points for traf-
fic exiting the ISP; the BGP updates collected by
CPs only determine the forward path to the target,
while information on the reverse path is not avail-
able; last, routing does not consist of the sole inter-
domain part, and CPs do not have any information
about intradomain routing changes occurring in the
traversed Autonomous Systems (ASes).
Despite these difficulties, we introduce an effec-
tive methodology for finding the “needle,” namely
for addressing the above stated problem. The method-
ology takes as input a sequence of RTT measure-
ments collected by a probe and a sequence of BGP
updates collected by a CP, and produces as output
a value in [0, 1] that determines the amount of cor-
relation between the two sequences. The method-
ology is based on the following main steps: (a) de-
tection of significant value changes in the sequence
of RTT measurements, based on a statistical tech-
nique called PELT [13]; (b) compensation of possi-
ble misalignments between the time instants recorded
for RTT measurements and those recorded for BGP
updates; and (c) matching of RTT variations and
BGP updates, to determine the amount of corre-
lation. We apply our methodology extensively to
publicly available data sets from the RIPE Routing
Information Service [21] and RIPE Atlas [6], and
validate its results using analytical methods and
by comparison with a ground truth derived from
traceroute data collected by the RIPE Atlas probes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we review the state of the art on proj-
ects devoted to assessing the quality of service of-
fered by ISPs and on methods to investigate the re-
lationships between control plane information and
measurement information. Section 3 is devoted to
describe our reference scenario. In Section 4 we il-
lustrate our correlation methodology. In Section 5
we validate the results obtained by applying our
methodology to publicly available data. Conclu-
sions and future work are presented in Section 6.
2. RELATEDWORK
Many organizations and projects are devoted to
assessing the quality of service offered by ISPs. Sam-
Knows [1] is a free broadband measurement ser-
vice for consumers. The Federal Communications
Commission and SamKnows have joined together
to provide American consumers with statistics on
their broadband connections. MisuraInternet [2]
is an Italian project for measuring the quality of
broadband access, supported by the Italian Author-
ity for Telecommunications. Project BISmark [22]
is a platform for performing measurements of ISP
performance. Related projects such as RIPE At-
las [6], CAIDA Ark [3], and M-Lab [4] perform large
scale active measurements towards several targets.
A framework to analyze the impact of routing
changes on network delays between end hosts is pre-
sented in [20]. The authors focus on understand-
ing how the network delay and jitter measured in
a stable routing state change after the routing has
switched to a new stable state. In their main experi-
mental setup they trigger active probing when real-
time monitored BGP updates are received. Their
findings indicate that there exists stability in the
resulting delay differences for the path before and
after the routing event, and correlation between
routing changes and delay. Hence, their results
strongly motivate our study. In [24] the authors
diagnose causes for routing events associated with
large ISPs, using continuous probing from multiple
end systems and building a greedy algorithm to ex-
plain multiple events occurring close in time with
small sets of causes. They validate their methodol-
ogy using routing disruptions publicly reported by
network operators. The analysis of end-to-end mea-
surements presented in [19] proves that most delay
variations are either link or router related, while
congestion can be observed rarely. A tool for the
visualization of the correlation between BGP and
RTT data is described in [9]; however the correla-
tion is an input of the tool, rather than an outcome.
Many other researchers have used statistical tools
for the analysis of trends in network data. In [16]
the authors describe a novel infrastructure for de-
tecting the impact of network upgrades on perfor-
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Figure 1: Our reference scenario. Ci, Pi,
and Ti are BGP routers gathering rout-
ing information (collector peers), network
probes, and targets (IP addresses), respec-
tively. Clouds are Autonomous Systems.
Dashed polylines are traffic paths.
mance. Their system extracts interesting so-called
“triggers” from a large number of network mainte-
nance activities. It then identifies behavior changes
in network performance caused by the triggers. It
uses statistical rule mining and network configu-
ration to identify commonality across the behav-
ior changes. [15] presents a new tool for detect-
ing maintenance-induced performance changes in a
timely fashion. It uses association between mainte-
nance and network elements to identify performance
metrics for time-series analysis. It uses a new Mul-
tiscale Robust Local Subspace algorithm (MRLS)
to accurately identify changes in performance.
3. REFERENCE SCENARIO
In order to obtain useful results with our method-
ology, BGP route collectors and network probes
that perform the measurements should be arranged
in a consistent way. In particular, our reference sce-
nario for the rest of the paper is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Each cloud represents a different Autonomous Sys-
tem (AS); we focus on AS1, namely we are inter-
ested in matching BGP routing information and
network measurements that are gathered within this
AS. We assume that the following collection points
are available inside AS1: a set of BGP routers Ci,
called Collector Peers (CPs), that forward all the
received BGP updates to a central BGP collector
for storage, and a set of boxes Pi, called probes,
that perform active measurements on a periodical
basis and store them to some other repository. Note
that a BGP router is not necessarily a collector peer
(see the unnamed routers in Fig. 1), and a collector
peer is not necessarily an egress point for traffic ex-
iting AS1 (as it is the case for C2). A measurement
is the action (ping, traceroute) that a probe under-
takes in order to collect some information (RTT,
router-level path) about a forwarding path towards
a certain destination, called target. In the scenario
in Fig. 1, each probe Pi can perform measurements
towards any of the targets Ti: the forward path
taken by probe traffic, indicated with dashed lines
in the figure, may vary depending on the control
plane information at intermediate routers and on
the target Ti. In the specific case when such traffic
traverses a collector peer, as it is the case for traffic
from P3 to T1, a matching between BGP routing in-
formation and network measurements is obviously
found. However, even when this does not happen
(for example, for C2 and C3), a correlation between
BGP routing changes and variations in measure-
ment results may still exist, provided that BGP
routing information is available for a BGP prefix
that comprises the measurement target under in-
vestigation: this is exactly what our methodology
helps to discover. To sum up, in the described sce-
nario the possibility to determine this correlation
depends on two factors: i) the availability of a set
of BGP collector peers and network probes within
the same AS, and ii) the availability of BGP rout-
ing information for a prefix that comprises the IP
address of the target under investigation.
4. MATCHINGBGPROUTINGCHANGES
AND RTT VARIATIONS
We now describe our methodology to automati-
cally determine a correspondence between BGP rout-
ing changes and delay variations. Inputs to this
methodology consist of data from the control plane
of BGP routers and from active RTT measurements
performed by network probes. We highlight that no
knowledge is assumed about the network topology,
the distribution of the probes, and the distribution
of CPs within the ISP. As a primary output, by
using this methodology it is possible to determine
whether a specific BGP routing change has an ob-
servable effect in the form of a variation in RTT val-
ues recorded by a probe. Our methodology has sev-
eral tunable parameters: in the following descrip-
tion we assume that they are all set to fixed values.
We show in Section 5 how our methodology can be
instantiated with different parameter values in or-
der to compute aggregate correlation estimates.
The main processing steps are represented in
Fig. 2(a), which can be used as a reading key for
the rest of the section. We highlight that both
BGP information and measurement information un-
dergo several processing operations before applying
the Matching step. In fact, one of the most rel-
evant challenges in matching measurements with
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Figure 2: The main processing steps of our methodology (a) and of its validation (b). Thick-
border boxes are input data or output results. Thin-border boxes are operations. Arrows
indicate inputs and outputs for each operation. Additional inputs and tunable parameters are
represented without a box (all occurrences of equally named parameters have the same value).
BGP routing changes is the intrinsically different
nature of the two data sets. Being active measure-
ments, RTTs are usually recorded by probes on a
periodical basis, whereas BGP updates are collected
at the exact time instants at which they occur: as an
immediate consequence, RTT values are available
at a constant rate over time, whereas it is common
to observe bursts consisting of lots of BGP changes
in a short time followed by long periods of stabil-
ity. Moreover, RTTs are subject to very frequent
variations over time, whereas BGP routing changes
involve a limited number of different paths. Given
the possibility that the clocks of BGP routers and
probes are not perfectly synchronized, we should
also take into account the presence of a time differ-
ence between the two kinds of data.
4.1 Processing of RTT Measurements
We start by describing the sequence of process-
ing steps that are applied to RTT measurements.
We consider as input to these steps a sequence of
RTT measurements performed on a periodical ba-
sis by a probe identified by a Probe ID towards a
fixed destination IP address which we call Target.
We assume that each RTT measurement consists of
a fixed-length sequence of RTT values (as it is often
the case, since the measurement is performed using
the ping command), augmented with the time in-
stant at which the measurement was performed and
with the actual IP address reached by the measure-
ment. Only measurements within a specified Time
window are considered for the analysis.
In the Preprocessing step we perform some fil-
tering operations to remove spurious RTT measure-
ments that do not convey useful data. As the sole
exception in our methodology, the actions under-
taken at this step are tailored to the specific mea-
surement infrastructure we used in our experimen-
tation, namely the RIPE Atlas [6] platform. Given
the format of the data from [6], RTT measurements
are expected to consist of 3 RTT values, of which we
only preserve the minimum one. With this choice
we aim at focusing on the propagation and trans-
mission delays, whose values are mostly dependent
on the length of forward and reverse router paths
and on the physical distance of traversed devices;
on the other hand, processing and queueing delays
are subject to high variability and may occasion-
ally affect individual RTT values (see, e.g., [10]).
We consider measurements that have less than 3
recorded RTT values or that reach an unexpected
IP address to be abnormal and we discard them.
We then perform a Time alignment step to ac-
count for several important aspects. First of all,
the observations of a BGP routing change and of a
corresponding variation in the RTT values may be
separated by a time lapse. In the general case, we
expect the RTT variation to occur after the routing
change that caused it. However, this is strongly in-
fluenced by the relative position of the CPs and of
the probes, because the time required for a change
to be propagated may vary according to network
conditions or to delays that are artificially intro-
duced by router settings such as the MRAI: depend-
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ing on these delays, the BGP routing change may
have a more recent timestamp than the correspond-
ing RTT variation. Further, there may be an offset
between the clock of the CPs and the clock of the
probes. In order to consider these aspects, we shift
the timestamps of RTT measurements by a fixed
Time shift value. We will show in Section 5 how to
find a suitable value for this parameter.
As discussed above, RTT measurements consist
of a sequence of highly variable RTT values. In-
deed, it is unlikely to find two consecutive RTT
measurements with the same RTT value, and every
RTT measurement could be considered as represen-
tative of a change in the network delays. The choice
of retaining only the minimum value for each RTT
measurement in the Preprocessing step can only
partially mitigate this issue. As an extreme conse-
quence, almost any BGP routing change could be
matched with an arbitrarily chosen RTT measure-
ment that is close enough in time. To overcome this
problem, we introduced a Changepoint detec-
tion step. In this step we process RTT measure-
ments in order to find significant changes in their
values. We adopt a methodology called changepoint
analysis, commonly used in statistical data science
to evaluate any time series and detect changes in
the data (for a survey, see [8]). Given the nature of
RTT values, we are interested in detecting the time
instants at which the mean value changes persis-
tently. We use a recent technique called PELT [13],
which is based on an exact and efficient algorithm
to detect both mean and variance shifts in time se-
ries data. PELT requires an input parameter called
“penalty” that affects the precision of the analy-
sis: a low value means that the algorithm should
consider also volatile mean shifts as valid changes,
whereas a high value only takes into account mean
shifts that span a considerable portion of the whole
input. The effect of different choices of the penalty
on the number of detected changepoints is depicted
in Fig. 3. We chose PELT because it is a very effi-
cient variation of a technique called Optimal Parti-
tioning [11], which is considered the state of the art
in the field. To apply the technique, we relied on a
publicly available implementation in R [5].
Choosing the right penalty value is not a simple
task. We adopt a rule called elbow method (see,
e.g. [12], where the method is applied to a clus-
tering problem), traditionally used by statisticians
on datasets that show the same distribution as in
Fig. 3: the chosen penalty is the one for which the
number of changepoints starts decreasing at a slow
pace for increasing values of the penalty. The un-
derlying intuition is that the PELT algorithm first
identifies the largest changes and then starts to add
smaller ones, eventually considering noise from the
data as legitimate mean variations. Hence, given
an Elbow slope threshold that represents an accept-
able difference quotient between the variation of
penalty and the corresponding variation in the num-
ber of changepoints, we enter an iterative process
whose building block is calledChangepoint anal-
ysis. We start with a low penalty p0 and com-
pute the number of changepoints cpt0. Then for
i = 1, . . . , n we compute a new penalty pi = f(i)
(with f(0) = p0), where f is a strictly increasing
function, and the number of changepoints cpti. The
loop ends for i = i∗ such that the difference quotient
δ =
pi∗−pi∗−1
cpti∗−1−cpti∗ is less than the specified Elbow
slope threshold. At this point we use the penalty pi∗
to transform the original sequence of RTT measure-
ments into a time-labeled step function.
On a side note, the Changepoint analysis re-
quires a simple sequence of samples as input, with-
out taking into account their timestamps. When a
candidate sample is elected as changepoint we as-
sociate the change with the original timestamp of
the sample. That means we are potentially intro-
ducing an error of magnitude equal to the period of
RTT measurements. In Section 4.3 we explain how
to mitigate such issue when matching BGP routing
changes with RTT changepoints.
4.2 Processing of BGP Routing Changes
The analysis of BGP information also involves
a number of steps before the matching with RTT
measurements. The input data consists of a se-
quence of routing changes observed by a Collector
peer in the BGP path used to reach a specified
Prefix. Each routing change contains the times-
tamp at which the change was observed and the
new AS-path (i.e. a sequence of AS numbers), or
an empty sequence when the CP observes a route
withdrawal. Similarly to what happens with RTT
measurements, we only consider routing changes
recorded within a specified Time window.
The Preprocessing step is needed to determine
which BGP routing changes are eligible for further
analysis. This filtering procedure is based on the
outcome of the Time alignment step described in
Section 4.1. While in principle every single BGP
event is crucial, our filtering is motivated by the
nature of the RTT measurements. First of all we
need to take into account the rate at which RTT
measurements are collected (one every 4 minutes for
RIPE Atlas [6]): for each pair of consecutive RTT
measurements we ignore all BGP routing changes
happening in between, except the last one. Further,
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we simply ignore all BGP routing changes occurring
between every pair of consecutive RTT measure-
ments that are separated by a time lapse greater
than an input Tolerance window (which should be
larger than the time between two consecutive RTT
measurements). Both decisions have the effect of
isolating BGP routing changes that can not be “seen”
in the available RTT measurements, therefore avoid-
ing any improper deductions on them.
4.3 Matching and Correlation
Once both the RTT measurements and BGP rout-
ing changes are cleaned up and processed, we can
look for a correspondence between the two datasets.
The role of the Matching step is to determine
whether each BGP routing change corresponds to
one or more RTT changepoints. For each prepro-
cessed BGP routing change with timestamp t, we
center the Tolerance window (described in Section 4.2)
at t obtaining a matching window. We use the latter
to filter RTT changepoints by timestamp and asso-
ciate those falling within a matching window with
the BGP routing change where that window is cen-
tered. Each BGP routing change is then marked as
“correlated” if there exists at least one RTT change-
point associated with it.
Finally, to produce the Correlation estimate, we
divide the number of correlated BGP routing changes
by the total number of preprocessed BGP routing
changes, obtaining a normalized value that we call
BGP-RTT correlation factor.
5. EXPERIMENTS AND VALIDATION
In this section we describe the data sets we con-
sidered to validate our methodology and discuss the
results of our experiments. We then further validate
these results by using of traceroute data.
5.1 Data Sets
The first condition to apply our methodology is
the availability of data sets matching the reference
scenario in Section 3. Traditionally, researchers an-
alyzed BGP and RTT information by exploiting
the data sources mentioned in Section 2 or by per-
forming ad-hoc measurements to build up a cus-
tomized data set (e.g., [20]). In this paper we make
use of data collected within two projects of grow-
ing popularity: the RIPE Routing Information Ser-
vice [21], that offers hundreds of worldwide spread
CPs, and RIPE Atlas [6], that gathers data from
thousands of probes performing pings, traceroutes,
and other measurements. Besides making notori-
ously rich data sources available to the public, both
projects are maintained by the same independent
Number of probes
1 2 3 4 5 7 13 22
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
C
P
s
1 22 1 1
2 12 3 3 2 1
3 1 1 1
4 1 1
5 1 1
6 1 1
7 1
Table 1: Available probes and CPs in the
data sets we used. Each cell contains a
count of the ASes for which the correspond-
ing number of probes and CPs are available.
Empty cells are equivalent to a zero count.
and non-profit organization, which increases the prob-
ability of finding ASes for which there are both CPs
and network probes and virtually eliminates from
the data any biases deriving from the interests of a
specific ISP.
As a preliminary step, we determined a set of
ASes suitable for our analysis: we found out that
in the RIS and Atlas data sets there were 55 ASes
that had at least one active CP and one active probe
as of January 2013. All these ASes host a total of
126 CPs (number of unique CPs seen by RIS col-
lectors between January 2011 and December 2012)
and 200 probes. In Table 1 we show a more precise
characterization of the set of selected ASes terms
of number of available CPs and probes. Although
most of the ASes only match the minimum require-
ment (i.e., one collector peer and one probe), there
are many interesting exceptions. We remark that
Atlas probes are configured with both an IPv4 AS
number and an IPv6 AS number, which may in gen-
eral be distinct: in performing the selection of ASes,
we only considered the IPv4 AS number.
We then selected a set of interesting targets. Within
the Atlas infrastructure, probes periodically per-
form measurements (typically pings, traceroutes, and
HTTP requests) towards a set of predefined targets
that include all the root name servers and some Web
services exposed by the RIPE NCC: we selected the
most interesting targets according to the following
criterion. For each target we used the RIPEstat
service [7] to determine the most specific IP pre-
fix containing it and seen by RIS route collectors,
and we analyzed the BGP and RTT data available
for that target. Considering the fact that RIPE
Atlas has only been active since late 2010, we ex-
tended the analysis over a time window of two years,
thus fixing the Time window parameter in Fig. 2
for all subsequent experiments from January 2011
6
Target
ID IP address
IP prefix
(Unicast/Anycast)
RTT data
(MBytes)
BGP data
(updates)
1001 193.0.14.129 (k.root-servers.net) 193.0.14.0/24 (A) 16,168 97,871
1003 193.0.0.193 (ns.ripe.net) 193.0.0.0/21 (U) 15,953 9,541
1004 192.5.5.241 (f.root-servers.net) 192.5.5.0/24 (A) 16,005 35,553
1005 192.36.148.17 (i.root-servers.net) 192.36.148.0/24 (A) 16,144 13,435
Table 2: Amount of available data for the selected ASes and measurement targets.
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Figure 3: Relationship between the penalty
value and the number of changepoints found
by the PELT algorithm. The plot was pro-
duced for measurement 1001, for data from
the Atlas probe #167, and with penalty val-
ues defined as pi = 1.05
i − 1, i ≥ 1.
until December 2012. We downloaded the follow-
ing data for all the 23 available targets and corre-
sponding IP prefixes: (a) BGP updates and table
dumps collected for all IP prefixes by all available
RIS collector peers; (b) RTT measurements (per-
formed every 4 minutes) and traceroute measure-
ments (performed every 20 minutes) collected by
all the Atlas probes. We then estimated the total
amount of available data for each target and IP pre-
fix, in order to restrict our study to a more mean-
ingful subset of targets. Table 2 contains the targets
that were selected, because they have a good trade-
off between the amount of available BGP routing
changes and RTT measurements, because they con-
tain a sample of both anycast and unicast prefixes,
and because they are associated with IP prefixes of
different lengths.
5.2 Parameter Tuning and Correlations
We cleaned them up the downloaded data in the
respective Preprocessing steps and then deter-
mined the correlation between RTT measurements
and BGP updates as described in Section 4. First
of all we processed all RTT measurements using
the PELT technique, with penalty values selected
according to the elbow method. Since at the be-
ginning we had no hints about the impact of the
Elbow slope threshold on the penalty and, therefore,
on the set of computed changepoints, we executed
the PELT implementation once for each of the fol-
lowing 12 Elbow slope threshold values: 0.001, 0.01,
0.1, 1, 5, 10, 50, 100, 200, 300, 1000, 10000. We
chose these values because they are representative of
a wide range of slopes in the penalty/changepoints
curve (see Fig. 3), resulting in different penalty val-
ues and, therefore, a different accuracy in searching
for changepoints. The function used to determine
the penalty values during the Changepoint de-
tection was pi = c
i
1 + c2, namely we considered
exponentially increasing penalty values. We made
this choice because we experimentally verified that
the number of changepoints that are no longer de-
tected by the PELT technique when increasing the
penalty decreases as the ratio pi/pi−1 decreases. We
performed preliminary computations with different
values of c1 and c2 (one is shown in Fig. 3), and
found that c1 = 2 and c2 = 0 was a good compro-
mise between computational time and granularity
of the applied penalty values. We therefore pre-
computed a clean set of RTT measurements where
only significant RTT value changes were retained.
We then applied the methodology with fixed val-
ues of the Time shift and of the Elbow slope thresh-
old, in order to better understand how to distinguish
“good” correlation values from “bad” ones. In par-
ticular, we focused on a single Target and consid-
ered the RTT values measured towards this target:
a set consisting of all the probes that recorded these
RTT values was correspondingly identified. We also
fixed an IP Prefix and considered the BGP updates
for that prefix: a set consisting of all the CPs that
recorded these updates was likewise identified. At
this point, we composed all the possible pairs con-
sisting of a probe from the first set and a CP from
the second set and computed the BGP-RTT corre-
lation factor for each such pair. We then computed
a distribution describing the frequency with which
different values of the correlation factor occurred.
In order to compare “good” values of the correlation
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Figure 4: Cumulated fraction of probe/CP
pairs exhibiting different values of the corre-
lation factor. Each plot corresponds to a dif-
ferent IP prefix. Only probes that collected
RTT data for measurement 1001 and only
CPs that recorded BGP updates for all the
7 prefixes are considered. The EST was fixed
to 0.001 and the time shift to 0.
factors with “bad” values, we repeated the same
computations by keeping the Target (and the cor-
responding probe data) fixed and by picking differ-
ent choices for the Prefix: for this purpose, we con-
sidered a random sample of 7 IP prefixes, selected
among those comprising at least one measurement
target: 128.8.0.0/16, 192.5.5.0/24, 192.36.148.0/24,
193.0.0.0/21, 193.0.14.0/24, 199.7.83.0/24, and
202.12.27.0/24. We then analyzed the obtained re-
sults by plotting for each considered prefix the Cu-
mulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the frac-
tion of probe/CP pairs having different values of the
correlation factor. A sample plot is shown in Fig. 4,
where the Target was fixed to 193.0.14.129, (mea-
surement 1001 in Table 2). In this figure, the X axis
represents values of the BGP-RTT correlation fac-
tor and the Y axis represents the cumulated fraction
of probe/CP pairs for which these values occurred.
In order to make correlation factors comparable, in
this plot we only considered CPs that recorded BGP
updates for all the 7 selected prefixes. Since the
Target was fixed to 193.0.14.129, correlation factors
computed for Prefix 193.0.14.0/24 were expected to
be higher, and in fact the corresponding CDF is
shifted to the right. Interestingly, only the CDF
for this prefix exhibits this particular shape, while
CDFs for all the other prefixes ramp up very quickly
and are much similar to each other. We found this
feature to recur in all our experiments, and con-
sidered it as a distinguishing mark between well-
correlated BGP and RTT information and badly
correlated information. Based on this observation,
we introduced a more aggregate correlation mea-
sure which, instead of considering single probe/CP
pairs, characterizes the relationship between a set of
RTT measurements for a Target and a set of BGP
routing changes for a Prefix. We called this mea-
sure correlation score, and computed it as the area
subtended by the CDF of correlation factors for all
the probe/CP pairs corresponding to the Target and
Prefix of interest. Note that a lower correlation score
indicates a better correlation. For example, for the
fixed Target considered in Fig. 4 the “good” cor-
relation score with BGP data for the Prefix that
comprises the Target is 0.93, whereas the correla-
tion scores for data for other BGP prefixes range
between 0.98 and 0.99.
After introducing the correlation score, we could
more easily assess the influence of the Elbow slope
threshold and of the Time shift on the computed
correlation values. We considered all the 4 measure-
ments in Table 2 and computed the correlation score
for each combination of a Target of these measure-
ments and a Prefix among the above selected sample
of 7. We repeated the same computation for sev-
eral combinations of Elbow slope threshold and Time
shift values. We picked the first in the set of 12 val-
ues, introduced in Section 5.2, that we used to pre-
compute RTT changepoints, and the second in the
following set of values (specified in seconds): −600,
−300, −120, 0, 120, 300, 600. Fig. 5 shows the out-
come of this analysis. Plots in each row correspond
to a specific Target. Left-side plots and right-side
plots are simply two views of the same plot. Each
surface refers to a different Prefix. Several conclu-
sions can be drawn by looking at the plots. First of
all, increasing the Elbow slope threshold results in a
better distinction between “good” and “bad” corre-
lation scores: this can be appreciated by observing
the separation between the surface corresponding to
the Prefix that comprises the Target under consid-
eration (lowest surface in all the plots) and the sur-
faces corresponding to other Prefixes. The motiva-
tion is that higher values of the Elbow slope threshold
result in lower penalties used during the Change-
point detection which, in turn, cause more RTT
changepoints to be detected by the Changepoint
analysis, resulting in higher chances for a success-
ful matching with BGP updates. Moreover, Elbow
slope thresholds larger than 10000 make little sense,
since unrelated Prefixes start to be improperly cor-
related with the considered Target: in fact, top-level
surfaces start to lower down for higher Elbow slope
8
threshold values (recall that lower scores correspond
to better correlation), and this is due to the exis-
tence of more RTT changepoints that match BGP
updates. In addition, for the Prefix that matches
each Target, the correlation score improves signifi-
cantly for specific values of the Time shift.
From the results conveyed by the plots in Fig. 5
we could determine that picking an Elbow slope thresh-
old equal to 10000 and a Time shift equal to 0,
indicated by an arrow in the plots, results in the
best separation between “good” and “bad” correla-
tion scores. Interestingly, these values are extremely
close to the optimal choice of parameters for all the
measurements we considered, and therefore fixed it
throughout the rest of the experiments. By per-
forming a similar analysis, and by considering the
rate of RTT measurements (one every 4 minutes),
we also fixed the Tolerance window at 16 minutes.
5.3 Equivalence Classes
Besides considering aggregated correlation values,
we further deepened the analysis by considering how
single BGP events seen at distinct CPs match with
RTT measurements recorded at different probes. A
sample of the results of this analysis is in Fig. 6.
Plots in each row consider data from all the probes
and CPs available within a specific AS, restricted
to a specific measurement target but regardless of
the prefix. Each point in the plots is a BGP up-
date. The X axis represents timestamps of BGP
updates (in left-side plots) or a progressive identi-
fier assigned to these updates according to the order
in which they occurred (in right-side plots). The
Y axis is divided into stripes, one for each probe;
within each stripe, two lines represent BGP updates
seen at a specific CP and that matched (Y) or did
not match (N) with an RTT changepoint recorded
by the corresponding probe. The topmost plots (a)
show a good matching between a specific probe and
CP, while other probes exhibit less correlation. This
is even more evident by looking at the sequence of
BGP updates in the right-side plot. Note that 2
CPs are actually available for this AS, but data for
one of them has been suppressed in Preprocess-
ing steps. The middle plots (b) show a good corre-
lation between the probe and CP available within
AS 513. Also in this plot only one of the 2 available
CPs are visible. The bottommost plots (c) show
how BGP updates recorded by a single CP may be
more correlated with different probes depending on
the time instant. Once again, this is more evident
by looking at the sequence of updates. Also in this
case, data from one additional CP was suppressed.
By looking at these plots, particularly (a) and (c),
it is pretty evident that BGP updates from a spe-
cific CP may be more or less correlated with RTT
values from a specific probe depending on the time
instant. It is therefore possible to point out equiv-
alence classes of CPs or probes, according to the
behavior they exhibit over time. For example, in
plot (c) probes 1 and 2 may be placed in the same
equivalence class because they roughly matched the
same BGP updates from the CP, whereas probes 3
and 4 may be placed in a different equivalence class
because they matched other BGP updates. This
kind of analysis may help an operator in determin-
ing how the performance of specific network paths is
affected by routing changes at specific BGP routers.
5.4 Validation with Traceroute Data
The probes we take into account also perform
traceroutes towards the same targets used for RTT
measurements. This gives us the possibility to build
a validation process for the correlation methodology
described in Section 4. We explain here the valida-
tion process and the results we obtained using the
data described in Section 5.1. Refer to Fig. 2(b) for
an outline of the main steps described below.
The validation process applies to a single probe/CP
pair, and considers a specific Target and a specific
Prefix. To perform the validation, we consider as
first input a sequence of time-labeled traceroute mea-
surements (performed with the standard traceroute
command). Each measurement consists of a se-
quence of IP addresses and possibly includes “null
hops”, i.e., hosts that do not reply to packets sent
by the probe. The second input is a partial result of
the methodology in Section 4: it consists of the com-
plete set of BGP updates collected by the selected
CP for the Prefix of interest, where each BGP up-
date is labeled as valid if it has been retained after
the Preprocessing step described in Section 4.2,
invalid otherwise. The last input consists of the cor-
relation factor for the considered probe/CP pair.
The collected data is subject to an IP→AS Map-
ping step. The goal is to determine what ASes are
traversed by each traceroute measurement, in order
to match them with BGP routing changes happen-
ing at the same time. Methods for IP-to-AS map-
ping from the literature [18, 17, 25] take into ac-
count many potential issues, e.g., the presence of IP
addresses announced by Internet Exchange Points
(IXPs) or peer ASes. However, all the existing ap-
proaches to the mapping rely on some preprocess-
ing step and none of them is currently available as a
public service or tool. In this paper we take a simple
approach and retain the assumption supported by
the literature that the IP-to-AS mapping derived
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Figure 5: 3D plots showing the value of the BGP-RTT correlation score obtained for different
values of the Elbow slope threshold and of the Time shift. Each row contains plots computed for
a specific Target, and two views are shown for each plot. Each surface represents correlation
scores for a different BGP prefix. The arrow indicates a choice of the Elbow slope threshold and
of the Time shift that improves the difference between “good” and “bad” correlation scores.
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Figure 6: Matching of the BGP updates seen by all the CPs of a specific AS with RTT
values measured by all the probes of the same AS. Plots in each row are for a specific AS
and measurement target. Each point in the plots is a BGP update. In left-side plots the X
axis represents the time instant when BGP updates were observed, while in right-side plots it
represents the sequence in which BGP updates occurred. In each plot, ordinates are divided
into stripes, each corresponding to data from a specific probe. Each stripe contains two lines
for each CP, representing matching (Y) and non-matching (N) BGP updates.
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from BGP routing tables is mostly correct. The
main steps of our mapping step can be described
as follows: 1) each private IP address at the begin-
ning of the traceroute path is mapped to the AS of
the probe originating the measurement; 2) each re-
maining IP address is mapped to the most specific
IP prefix containing it that is publicly announced
on BGP and seen by RIS collectors. The first infor-
mation is made available on the Atlas homepage [6],
while the latter can be retrieved using RIPEstat [7].
For each prefix, the AS that announces it is elected
as representative for all the IP addresses contained
in the prefix. In case there is more than one AS
announcing the same prefix, the one seen as the
prefix originator by the majority of RIS collectors
is elected. In case there is no IP prefix matching the
IP address we map the latter to a special number
representing an unknown AS; 3) in the resulting se-
quence of ASes, identical consecutive AS numbers
are collapsed; 4) AS numbers corresponding to pub-
licly known IXPs are removed from the sequence.
After performing a Time alignment step in the
same way as for RTT measurements (see Section 4.1),
we put together the traceroute measurements and
the BGP routing changes in the Matching step.
We consider the sequence of all BGP routing changes
u1, . . . , un with related timestamps t1, . . . , tn. For
each valid BGP routing change ui (1 < i < n)
we consider two time windows T< = [ti−1, ti] and
T> = [ti, ti+1] which are determined as the stability
periods before and after ui. We then obtain M<
and M>, i.e. the two sequences of traceroute mea-
surements respectively falling within T< and T>.
We discard valid BGP updates where either M< or
M> are empty. Given the last traceroute measure-
ment in M< with the highest timestamp we call
mi−1 the sequence of ASes obtained by mapping its
IP addresses. Similarly, mi is the sequence of ASes
corresponding to the first traceroute measurement
in M>. We combine the above information in a
quadruple qi = (mi−1, ui−1,mi, ui) and call Q the
set containing all such quadruples.
Finally, the output of the correlation between
RTT measurements and BGP routing changes is
validated as follows. The analysis is applied to each
qi ∈ Q computed in the previous step and makes
use of the outcome of the BGP-RTT Matching
step for BGP routing change ui (see Section 4.1).
For each qi ∈ Q we simply check whether ui−1 6= ui
and mi−1 6= mi, and mark ui as “validated” if
both conditions hold. Given such information, we
can compute two quality measures for the Valida-
tion as follows. We first split Q into two sets Q+
and Q−: the first contains all the qi ∈ Q such that
the BGP routing change ui is correlated with an
RTT measurement, while the second is defined as
Q− = Q \Q+. We then define the BGP-traceroute
correlation factor as the ratio |qi∈Q+: ui is validated||Q+|
and the BGP-traceroute false negative factor as the
ratio |qi∈Q−: ui is validated||Q−| . Intuitively, the first fac-
tor measures the precision of our BGP-RTT corre-
lation methodology, while the second gives an in-
dication of how many correspondences between the
data plane and the control plane are not captured.
The results of the validation are in Fig. 7. Each
row contains plots related to a specific measure-
ment, thus determining both the Target and the Pre-
fix. Circles in each plot represent probe/CP pairs.
Other features are described in the figure caption.
The left-side plots exhibit common features that
confirm the precision of our methodology. In par-
ticular, the vast majority of probe/CP pairs with
a high BGP-RTT correlation factor (greater than
0.6) have a high BGP-traceroute correlation factor.
That means that BGP routing changes that are well
correlated with RTT changepoints are also well cor-
related with traceroutes. The data for measurement
1004 apparently contains some false positives: by
manual inspection we found out that they are sim-
ply due to some failed IP-to-AS mappings.
The right-side plots help us understand how many
correlations cannot be detected with our methodol-
ogy. In these plots we expect to see BGP-RTT false
negative factors close to zero for probe/CP pairs
whose BGP-RTT correlation factor is low. Namely,
poorly correlated BGP and RTT data should find
no evidence of correlation even at the traceroute
level. Measurements 1001, 1004, and 1005 match
our expectation, while 1003 is the only notable ex-
ception. A manual inspection of traceroute data
confirmed the correlation with BGP routing changes.
After comparing several metrics on the input data
(e.g. mean value and variance of RTT measure-
ments, number of computed changepoints, etc.), we
suspect that this exception may be related to the
fact that both the unicast target and most of the
probes are topologically close, leading to shorter
AS-paths and, possibly, less identifiable RTT changes.
6. CONCLUSIONSANDFUTUREWORK
In this paper we describe a methodology for an-
alyzing the relationship between variations of net-
work performance measured by probes and interdo-
main routing changes recorded by BGP route collec-
tors. We show several examples of correlation that
can be discovered between the two kinds of data by
using our methodology. Moreover, we discuss how
12
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Figure 7: Validation with traceroute data. Circles represent probe/CP pairs. Each row
contains two plots computed for each measurement. Left-side plots show the BGP-traceroute
correlation factors and the BGP-RTT correlation factors for all the probe/CP pairs with
|Q+| > 0. Right-side plots show the BGP-traceroute false negative factors and the BGP-
RTT correlation factors for all the probe/CP pairs with |Q−| > 0. The size of each circle is
proportional to |Q+| and |Q−|, respectively.
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to tune the input parameters of our methodology
for best results and validate it using traceroute in-
formation collected by the probes as a ground truth.
There are lots of facets of our methodology that
deserve further investigation. First of all, at present
we consider actual RTT values only to compute the
changepoint analysis, and actual BGP paths only
during the validation. Actual traceroute paths are
not fully considered in the validation phase either.
We believe the quality of the correlation could be
further improved by taking these into account also
at other steps of the methodology. Moreover, at
present we discard spurious RTT measurements: in-
stead, they could be possible hints of the presence
of a routing problem or change. A solid criterion to
automate the decision whether RTT data for a Tar-
get and BGP data for a Prefix have a good correla-
tion is still to be determined. We could also further
investigate the impact of methodology parameters
on the produced results, for example by considering
different functions for determining the penalty for
the Changepoint detection or different width
and centering for the Tolerance window. In addition,
we should take into account possible changes in the
location of the probes over time. The validation
process could finally be enhanced by improving the
IP-to-AS mapping and the technique to compare
traceroute paths with AS paths.
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